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The introduction and subsequent over-prescribing of extended-release opioids in the 
United States resulted in a large rise in both addiction and overdose.  Recognition and 
regulation of these new drugs as addictive did little to control the supply of opioids to 
Americans while Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Abuse Deterrent 
reformulations had limited effect to control the problem.  Simultaneously, states like 
Michigan and Rhode Island legalized medical marijuana through voter referenda opening 
the door for a new approach to pain management.  Recent research has found medical 
marijuana has proven an effective treatment for conditions such as chronic pain and 
PTSD and could serve as a substitute to extended-release opioids for pain management.  
Leveraging ARCOS data and controlling for cross-border transaction cost measured as 
distance to state borders and legal jurisdictions, this study uses a novel identification 
method and variable set to explore what effect medical marijuana had on opioid use.  
This analysis finds that medical marijuana is associated with higher opioid use in states 
that pass such laws and lower use in neighboring states along the shared border.  This 
result highlights both the endogeneity that plagues analysis of addictive substances which 
likely explains the first result, and the importance of defining new measures to better 
understand the true nature of the complex decision to use these substances.  
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Introduction	
In the last two decades the United States has undergone a contradicting and 
unanticipated shift in drug policy.  California ratified the first medical marijuana law 
(MML) in 1996 (Rosalie L. Pacula et al., 2015) and by 2006 ten states had legalized 
medical marijuana in some fashion.  Eight more states had taken similar measures by the 
end of 2012, with Colorado and Washington decriminalizing marijuana for recreational 
use.  At the same time, the country has been ravaged by an unforeseen epidemic of opioid 
addiction.  Between 1992 and 2012, the number of opioids prescribed in the United States 
more than doubled from 107.26 million doses to a peak of 277.29 million doses (Newton, 
2018).  In 2017 the Department of Health and Human Services declared a national 
emergency to coordinate the effort to end opioid abuse (HHS.gov).  In 2017 there were 
over 47 thousand overdose deaths from opioids (CDC Injury Center, 2019).  Today, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) estimates 130 daily deaths can be 
linked to the epidemic.  Oxycodone and Hydrocodone remain the most abused opioids, 
and the most prevalent on the street (Cicero et al., 2005). 
Both trends have become focal points of research to better understand the nature 
of addiction and pain management.  Lynch and Campbell (2011) compared 18 double-
blind, random controlled, medical studies and concluded that marijuana served as an 
effective treatment for non-cancer chronic pain.  While this confirms marijuana’s efficacy 
as a medication, patients need confidence that marijuana will be effective for pain 
management.  Bowles (2012) compared descriptive data available from patient registries 
and found that 92.2% of patients were prescribed marijuana for the management of 
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chronic pain.  Beyond this, Bradford and Bradford (2016) compared Medicare Part D 
prescribing rates between states, and found that prescriptions for pain dropped 11% in 
states with medical marijuana.  Bradford and Bradford also confirm that opioid 
prescribing rates drop when medical marijuana is available, confirming patients view 
marijuana as a substitute to opioids.  Finally, Shi (2017) compared hospitalization rates 
between states and concluded that medical marijuana was associated with a 13% decrease 
in opioid overdoses.  These deaths are highly associated with abusive behavior and have 
served as a strong indicator of the state of the opioid epidemic.   
These studies suggest that marijuana is a substitute for opioids to manage chronic 
pain and could affect abusive behavior as well.  As more states consider implementing 
medical marijuana programs, or full decriminalization, further research is required to 
confirm this relationship.  Leveraging FDA data measuring the supply of opioids to 
counties between 2006 and 2012, this study measures what impact medical marijuana 
laws have on opioid consumption within the state and in neighboring states.  To identify 
the trends between marijuana and opioid consumption, each counties distance to the 
nearest state border and legal marijuana are used to measure the cost of procurement for 
each substance.  Under a fixed effects analysis, this study finds the demand for opioids 
decreased by over $1 million in the average county when the distance to the nearest legal 
marijuana decreases by 100 miles.  While endogeneity continues to be the largest issue 
faced when studying addictive substances, this study confirms that the distance to 
different legal jurisdictions has an effect on the cost and subsequently the demand for 
these substances.  
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Literature	Review	
The	Opioid	Epidemic	
In 1995, OxyContin was introduced by Purdue Pharma and approved by the FDA 
for use as a prescription pain reliever (Jones et al., 2018).  OxyContin was innovative for 
its slowed release of oxycodone allowing a single dose to provide relief for up to 12 
hours (FDA Opioid Timeline, 2019).  Before this breakthrough, pain management 
prescriptions were immediate release which required dosing every 4-6 hours and often 
caused a euphoric high when taken.  Purdue Pharma marketed OxyContin as non-
addictive because the extended-release mechanism prevented the initial spike in euphoria 
from normal consumption (Jones et al., 2018).  The unseen danger laid in abuse of opioid 
prescriptions, which sabotaged the time delay feature of OxyContin to receive the full 
dose of oxycodone at once.  Purdue Pharma pled guilty in 2007 to misleading patients, 
medical providers, and government officials by claiming that OxyContin was non-
addictive (Meier, 2007).  By this time, the damage had been done and a massive shift in 
pain management had occurred in the United States.  
It is worth clarifying nomenclature for this study.  For simplicity, take opioids to 
represent all medications that contain opium-derived substances including hydrocodone, 
oxycodone, and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl.  To achieve euphoric high, these 
medications can be used in ways unintended by medical professionals.  Collectively 
referred to as abuse, this includes taking much higher doses than prescribed or crushing 
extended-release pills (such as Oxycontin) for an increased immediate effect.  More 
recently, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl have been prescribed as a dermal patch 
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intended to slowly release the medication while the patch is worn.  Wearing multiple 
patches at once or extracting the medication from the patch and injecting the raw opiate 
are common forms of abuse (US GAO, 2011).   
In addition to how medications are abused, a vital question is how they are 
obtained. Most opioids are obtained through diversion, the act of removing medications 
from legitimate supply chains for illegitimate use.  Some forms of diversion include 
outright theft from pharmacies or forgery of prescriptions.  One pharmacist in 
Pennsylvania made over $900,000 illegally selling prescriptions through the back of his 
store, which he lost in the stock market before being caught (Offit, 2017).  The vast 
majority of illegal opioids are diverted through “doctor shopping” where patients visit 
numerous medical providers to get as many prescriptions as possible (Newton, 2018).  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a review of prescriptions filled 
by Medicare Part D beneficiaries and identified patients by the number of opioid doses 
they received and the number of physicians writing the prescriptions.  Doctor shopping 
was suspected when patients received more doses than would be reasonably needed in a 
year.  The GAO found that 71% of suspected doctor shoppers received prescriptions from 
more than 5 providers in one year (US GAO, 2011).  The same authors found that 80% of 
suspected doctor shoppers sought prescriptions for OxyContin or hydrocodone and noted 
one patient that received prescriptions from 87 unique medical providers in one year.  
Extended release medications fueled opioid addiction by providing higher doses of 
oxycodone and hydrocodone in a single pill, and became the focus of policy makers for 
more than a decade to curtail the ensuing addiction.    
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Abuse-Deterrent	Reformulation	
In 2010, abuse-deterrent (non-crushable) formulas were approved by the FDA.  
These changes made crushing the tablets much more difficult to prevent further abusive 
behaviors.  Using a time series analysis of opioid prescribing rates, Alpert et al. (2018) 
found that non-medical abuse of opioids reduced by up to 40% but subsequently resulted 
in large increases in use of heroin and other illegal substances available for substitution.  
Because random trials were not used in this analysis, Alpert et al. note their results imply 
causality rather than confirming it.  Cicero and Ellis (2015) reached the same conclusion 
after conducting interviews with a group of individuals who self-identify with an opioid 
addiction; respondents were questioned about potentially abusive behaviors before and 
after the reformulation.  Of those respondents that quit these methods of OxyContin 
misuse, 70% reported substituting to heroin due to the change.  
Both Alpert et al. and Cicero and Ellis identify a danger of supply-side 
intervention in the drug market, which often drives demand through substitution to other 
addictive substances.  Cicero et al. (2005) note that opioids are easier to obtain in rural 
and suburban areas than heroin, and individuals with addiction are less likely to be caught 
by law enforcement using opioids than street drugs.  If these individuals are driven to 
substitute, their risk of overdose increases because street drugs have inconsistent dosing 
and purity where prescriptions have government-regulated standards to control for such 
concerns (Cicero et al., 2005).   
Prescription	Drug	Monitoring	Programs	
To combat doctor shopping, policymakers began implementing Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs (PDMP) to enable providers and prevent overprescribing 
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(Buchmueller & Carey, 2018).  At the beginning of the crisis, patients would “shop” 
doctors in a close area, limiting travel to use different pharmacies and providers.  In the 
early years of the opioid epidemic, there were few PMPD’s and all were contained to 
their respective state borders (Bulloch, 2018).  The majority (70%) of existing PMPD’s 
were founded between 2000 and 2015.  In the initial years, doctors were asked to 
voluntarily report patients suspected of opioid diversion or misuse (Bulloch, 2018).  
Buchmueller and Carey (2018) find that voluntary programs do not affect doctor 
shopping. 
The PDMP Center of Excellence (2014) recommends states mandate doctor 
reporting and program usage for all scheduled drug prescriptions.  Using time series 
analysis of prescribing rates, Buchmueller and Carey (2018) find that when states make 
this change, all opioid prescribing rates decrease. Despite this, Buchmueller and Carey 
also conclude that mandatory PDMPs drive demand across state borders to continue 
doctor shopping.  Presently, 49 states and the District of Columbia have enacted PDMPs 
and 46 states participate in a national collaboration with the PMP Interconnect (PDMP 
FAQ).  Despite these extensive efforts, some medical professionals continue to enable 
illegal efforts for various reasons.  In Virginia, a doctor was sentenced to 40 years in 
prison after he prescribed 500 thousand opioid doses in 2 years, resulting in 861 federal 
drug convictions (Hassan, 2019).  
Economic	Theory	and	Marijuana	
To model changes in drug policy, economists have turned to the “shadow cost” of 
consumption (Bretteville-Jensen & Biørn, 2004; Saffer & Chaloupka, 1999; van Ours, 
1995).  The shadow cost for an illicit good includes the inherent cost of purchase, the 
7 
 
risks of illegal activity (arrest, reputation, and other legal ramifications), transaction costs 
to obtain the illicit substance, and issues with drug quality.  Prescription drug monitoring 
programs increase opioid shadow costs by increasing the transaction cost of diversion 
(Buchmueller & Carey, 2018).  Medical marijuana programs decrease shadow costs by 
providing legal and social amnesty to patients and set legal standards for product testing 
and purity (Bowmaker, 2005).  Early research into marijuana focused on its effect on 
mental health, employment outcomes, and educational attainment.  Van Ours and 
Williams (2015) completed a broad survey of prior econometric research to consider 
what affects marijuana may have similar to drug use.  While marijuana use is strongly 
associated with increased rates of depression and anxiety, Van Ours and Williams find 
that most studies fail to rule out reverse causality and underlying endogeneity.  Despite 
this, Van Ours and Williams conclude employment status and wages are not affected by 
marijuana use.   
Sabia and Nguyen (2018) expand this by investigating the effect of medical 
marijuana law (MML) on wages and employment in a state level analysis of the United 
States.  Sabia and Nguyen found medical marijuana had no effect on these measures.  
Even though this recognition significantly reduces some aspects of the shadow cost of 
marijuana, the effect of the policy is limited by the transaction costs to purchase 
marijuana.  When states legally recognize medical marijuana dispensaries, these 
transaction costs decrease and access to marijuana increases (Rosalie L. Pacula et al., 
2015).  Brinkman and Mok-Lamme (2017) use a novel approach by measuring crime in a 
“highly localized” dataset.  These measures are then matched with indicator variables for 
whether a recreational dispensary opened in the neighborhoods observed.  Controlling for 
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geospatial effects, Brinkman and Mok-Lamme find a sharp decline in crime when 
dispensaries open locally.  Dragone et al. (2018) reach the same conclusion after 
completing a county level analysis of the border between Oregon and Washington.  With 
legalized recreational marijuana available in Washington, there was a decrease in crime 
both in state and across the border.  In particular, this effect was measured using a spatial 
regression discontinuity design.   
To understand if a similar effect occurred in the opioid epidemic, Shi (2017) used 
hospitalization records from 1997 through 2014 and found MMLs which recognize 
dispensaries are associated with a 23% decrease in admittance related to opioid addiction, 
and an 11% decrease in admittance from opioid overdose.  Powell et al. (2018) reach the 
same conclusion using different data to measure opioid related hospitalization rates.  
Each researcher noted the importance of medical dispensaries as a measure of access to 
medical marijuana product, lowering transaction costs. 
Data	
ARCOS	Prescription	Data	
Pursuant to a Freedom of 
Information Act request filed by the 
Washington Post (2019), the DEA released 
data from the Automation of Reports and 
Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) 
detailing the supply of opioids between the 
years of 2006 and 2012, which was later expanded to 2014.  This database records every 
Table 1.  Transactions used to tabulate 
dataset by Year 
Year Transaction Count 
2006 1,415,038 
2007 1,596,945 
2008 1,738,569 
2009 1,790,102 
2010 1,999,285 
2011 2,087,355 
2012 2,147,903 
Total 12,775,197 
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supply chain 
transaction for all 
federally controlled 
substances until 
dispensed to the 
patient.  In addition to 
all relevant details of 
the buyer and seller 
this database tracks 
the drug name, number of doses, strength of the dose, and the amount of the “base” drug 
purchased (i.e. hydrocodone or oxycodone).  Sellers are required to report these 
transactions for all controlled substances based on federal law.  Based on the time frame 
of this study, Medical Marijuana Laws (MML) enacted in Michigan and Rhode Island are 
the focus of this research. Both states underwent marijuana decriminalization (removing 
legal penalties for patients) during this period.   
 The number of observations in each state and year are provided in Tables 1 and 2 
respectively.1  There is a steady increase in the number of transactions between 2006 and 
2014.  The states with medical marijuana laws enacted during this time frame have been 
highlighted in green in Table 2.  Pharmacies are discouraged by regulators and insurance 
companies from holding large quantities for fear of break in, theft, or diversion by 
 
1 Two transactions were excluded from this analysis as outliers caused by reporting error.  Each 
transaction represented an unprecedented order for pharmacies that typically order small amounts. 
Table 2.  Count of transactions used to tabulate dataset for 
selected states.  
State Medical Marijuana 
Decriminalization 
Transactions in 
Data 
Connecticut  1,096,271 
Indiana  2,185,607 
Massachusetts  1,567,857 
Michigan Dec 2008 2,610,515 
Ohio  3,120,430 
Rhode Island Jan 2008 360,905 
Wisconsin  1,833,612 
Total  12,775,197 
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employees (Newton, 2018).  The same authors note federal law restricts the quantity of 
opioids that can be dispensed to a patient at one time, limiting supplies for chronic pain to 
one month.  By summing orders for each month, the total grams of hydrocodone and 
oxycodone sold to pharmacies proxies the demand for each drug in that month. Similarly, 
summing the total pill count delivered in each month gives a proxy for the demand for 
opioid doses in each county.  Finally, the combined effect of these drugs can be observed 
by multiplying the weight of each drug by the morphine equivalence factor to reach the 
equivalent weight of morphine and then summing these weights for each county and 
month.  Together, these measures represent a time-series panel dataset to on opioid use 
from 2006 through 2012.   
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Table 3.  Summary statistics for all states  
Variable Mean St Dev Min Max 
     
Hydrocodone (Kilograms) 1,616.7 7,752.4 0 1,043,302 
     
Connecticut 1,202.4 1,349.2 77.6 16,134.5 
Indiana 1,635.8 12,311.2 0 1,043,302 
Massachusetts 2,270.9 4,789.0 1.9 41,588.2 
Michigan 2,248.6 7,286.0 7.4 91,133.3 
Ohio 1,835.0 5,622.5 0.0 161,716.3 
Rhode Island 2,015.3 2,139.3 68.0 11,670.7 
Wisconsin 465.4 1,310.0 1.9 38,388.8 
     
Oxycodone (Kilograms) 1,449.1 4,438.7 0 89,866.6 
     
Connecticut 6,063.2 7,093.1 391.5 31,134.0 
Indiana 437.5 1,331.3 0 70,263.8 
Massachusetts 7,091.1 6,590.5 24.9 44,644.8 
Michigan 662.7 2,921.0 0.2 58,617.0 
Ohio 2,411.9 6,120.7 8.2 89,866.6 
Rhode Island 1,969.0 2,194.5 136.6 10,524.1 
Wisconsin 777.8 3,748.7 0.2 56,524.7 
     
Hydrocodone (Pills) 143,641.5 316,345 0 3,095,200 
     
Connecticut 358,334.9 251,794.3 45,900 926,270 
Indiana 220,044.9 366,075.7 0 3,845,270 
Massachusetts 359,266.8 306,173.9 1,600 1,115,744 
Michigan 355,735.3 870,265.9 3,860 8,888,605 
Ohio 257,534.5 410,964.2 200 3,055,060 
Rhode Island 355,819.2 360,680.3 19,500 1,307,170 
Wisconsin 120,786.5 21,4906 1,800 1,942,771 
     
Oxycodone (Pills) 251,388.1 521,542.9 0 8,888,605 
     
Connecticut 646,651.9 553,666.1 86,900 2,064,214 
Indiana 58,647.3 117,782.6 0 1,544,780 
Massachusetts 730,241.5 523,107.7 8,600 1,944,800 
Michigan 58,402.0 139,403.0 100 1,605,680 
Ohio 202,148.9 377,417.6 2,300 3,095,200 
Rhode Island 251,524.0 244,896.2 29,200 995,900 
Wisconsin 97,573.8 273,507.5 100 3,048,220 
  
12 
 
Table 4.  Summary statistics for all states.  
 
Variable Mean St Dev Min Max 
     
Hydrocodone (Grams per capita) 13.03 28.81 0 3,778.74 
     
Connecticut 2.80 2.53 0.52 59.57 
Indiana 21.72 47.56 0 3,778.74 
Massachusetts 3.89 6.29 0.19 56.23 
Michigan 15.52 24.04 0.69 819.55 
Ohio 11.13 17.30 0.00 439.41 
Rhode Island 8.71 5.75 1.15 40.05 
Wisconsin 4.54 5.86 0.12 217.15 
     
Oxycodone (Grams per capita) 7.64 19.76 0 1,236.53 
     
Connecticut 11.36 6.31 2.62 36.16 
Indiana 6.11 15.90 0 1,236.53 
Massachusetts 15.47 8.27 2.47 83.80 
Michigan 3.05 3.52 0.01 82.27 
Ohio 14.32 34.57 0.32 1,042.33 
Rhode Island 8.44 3.77 2.69 23.40 
Wisconsin 4.56 4.91 0.01 62.09 
     
Hydrocodone (Pills per capita) 2.31 1.36 0 14.94 
     
Connecticut 0.89 0.23 0.30 1.59 
Indiana 3.14 1.47 0 10.44 
Massachusetts 0.77 0.25 0.16 1.50 
Michigan 2.99 1.37 0.38 14.94 
Ohio 1.95 0.84 0.01 7.14 
Rhode Island 1.56 0.55 0.38 3.04 
Wisconsin 1.42 0.59 0.10 4.02 
     
Oxycodone (Pills per capita) 0.95 0.62 0 8.75 
     
Connecticut 1.42 0.34 0.58 2.39 
Indiana 0.80 0.50 0 4.27 
Massachusetts 1.74 0.45 0.82 3.41 
Michigan 0.51 0.30 0.01 2.36 
Ohio 1.38 0.72 0.10 8.75 
Rhode Island 1.19 0.34 0.57 2.39 
Wisconsin 0.88 0.44 0.00 3.22 
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Table 5.  Summary statistics for all states and years.  
 
Variable Mean St Dev Min Med Max 
      
Morphine Equivalence 
(Kilograms) 3,790.40 11,824.5 0.03 875.85 1,045,560 
      
2006 2,682.77 6,858.27 0.03 597.28 97,283.5 
2007 3,198.45 8,729.80 5.23 715.41 109,456.0 
2008 3,415.60 10,107.99 5.06 791.85 168,802.2 
2009 3,920.09 10,457.50 5.97 965.99 156,825.1 
2010 4,000.70 10,333.91 3.00 946.34 122,240.2 
2011 4,456.74 11,532.03 4.16 1,056.97 184,760.0 
2012 4,859.11 20,020.43 4.76 1,115.23 1,045,560 
      
Connecticut 10,297.30 11,665.4 754.95 4,082.94 48,773.08 
Indiana 2,292.15 12,800.23 0.03 864.81 1,045,560 
Massachusetts 12,907.64 13,715.96 44.73 11,575.53 108,555.46 
Michigan 3,242.72 11,163.85 9.90 617.90 144,437.83 
Ohio 5,452.97 13,356.40 17.92 1,357.15 188,313.19 
Rhode Island 4,968.91 5,190.50 332.48 2,440.64 20,855.83 
Wisconsin 1,632.24 6,631.27 3.00 330.23 93,269.40 
      
Morphine Equivalence 
(Grams per capita) 24.50 43.53 0.00 16.62 14.94 
      
2006 19.42 51.51  0.00  11.33  1,599.42  
2007 21.34  53.54  0.31  13.53  1,658.12  
2008 20.64  21.24  0.33  14.93  327.07  
2009 25.84  27.00  0.40  17.88  395.53  
2010 25.13  24.01  0.20  18.30  298.96  
2011 28.19  29.32  0.28  21.01  617.11  
2012 30.96  70.83  0.32  22.11  3,786.92  
      
Connecticut 19.86 10.24 5.07 17.62 66.84 
Indiana 30.90 54.89 0.00 22.51 3,786.92 
Massachusetts 27.10 16.63 4.41 24.18 146.79 
Michigan 20.11 25.70 1.07 14.64 820.66 
Ohio 32.62 59.74 1.02 21.50 1,658.12 
Rhode Island 21.39 10.23 5.94 19.01 58.44 
Wisconsin 11.39 10.46 0.20 8.84 223.88 
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Measures	of	Distance	and	Medical	Marijuana	Law	
With the implementation of PDMPs, doctor shopping has evolved to circumvent 
these restrictions.  Individuals with addiction or who divert opioids travel necessary 
distances to see multiple providers and receive as many prescriptions as possible.  
Presumably, these individuals travel the shortest distance possible across monitoring 
borders.  In the same vein, medical marijuana would be more accessible to patients 
outside of the intended state as a function of the distance to that state’s border.  The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) provides a dataset which provides the 
distance between all counties in the United States.  For each county in this study, the 
distance to the nearest border is measured as the shortest distance to a county in a 
different state.  The distance to the nearest medical marijuana is measured as the shortest 
distance to either Michigan or Rhode Island.  Because medical marijuana is only legal for 
a portion of the study period, this distance is set to 500 miles for all counties prior to 
legalization and is set to 1 mile for counties inside Michigan and Rhode Island.  The first 
is an arbitrary measure chosen to cap the potential distance a person would be willing to 
travel to purchase marijuana in a jurisdiction where it is legal; traveling farther than this 
would be unexpected when compared to the relative cost of black-market activity.  The 
second is to prevent the loss of observations if a log specification is used and would 
represent the last mile cost of visiting a commercial store.   
To properly measure the impact of medical marijuana, this study focuses on when 
these laws are effective for patients (versus when the laws were enacted).  Each state 
determined how to define their MML, and as a result no two states have the same laws.  
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Early MMLs focused on how legal amnesty was granted to patients and medical 
providers, and patients were often limited to cultivating their own marijuana at home.  To 
know when each law was effective for patients, it is necessary to review the history of 
medical marijuana in each state.  
Michigan has a unique history with medical marijuana.  The initial MML passed 
was vague and did not clarify if dispensaries were legal (Associated Press, 2011; Rosalie 
L. Pacula et al., 2015).  Dispensaries in the state operated under this legal vagueness from 
November 2008 through February 2013 when the Michigan Supreme Court ruled the 
initial law did not grant amnesty to dispensaries (The Huffington Post, 2013).  This is 
corroborated with multiple reports of sporadic law enforcement raids of these 
dispensaries during this time (Associated Press, 2011).  This means Michigan effectively 
had medical dispensaries during this time, even though the law did not allow for them.   
In comparison to this, Rhode Island followed a traditional timeline in legalizing 
medical marijuana.  The state’s first medical marijuana law gave patients protection with 
optional registration with the state in 2008 (Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., 2014).  In 
2010, registration became mandatory but gave additional protections to patients by 
preventing law enforcement from issuing citations.  Pacula et al. (2014) note the 
importance of both making registration optional and providing additional legal 
protections to patients, but both policies give similar outcomes.  To combine this 
information with the measures for opioid use, marijuana legality is coded as a 1 for all 
observations after December 2008 in Michigan and after January 2008 in Rhode Island.  
All other observations are coded as a 0. 
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Control	Variables	
To control for endogenous differences between counties, control variables were 
aligned with the above data sources from the American Community Survey conducted by 
the US Census Bureau.  This survey is conducted through the course of each year and is 
used to estimate a variety of community and population measures between the decenial 
censuses.  Population measures include the total county population, the proportion of the 
population that is female, median household income, and the proportion of the population 
living in poverty.  Additionally, the proportion of each of the Black, American Indian, 
Asian, and Pacific Islander communities are included.  Finally, the population is broken 
down by proportion in age brackets for those 19 years and under, 20 to 39 years in age, 
40 to 64 years in age and above 65 years in age.  These data points are provided on an 
annual basis for each county and are combined on a county to county basis with the 
aggregated ARCOS data, categorical MML data, and distance measures with each year 
paired with every pre-existing datapoint in that year.   
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Model	
To estimate the affect these policy shifts have on the demand for opioids, it is 
necessary to use a fixed effects time series regression at the county level.  Fixed effects 
are included to control for invariant endogeneity between states and over time, allowing 
the model to capture the difference between like observations and between periods.  For 
each measure of opioid demand, I estimate the linear form:  
𝑦!,#,$ = 𝛼# + 𝛾% + β&𝑀𝑀𝐿%,# + 𝛽'(𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)! 
+𝛽((𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑎	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)# + χ),* + 𝜖!,# 
(1) 
where 𝑦!,#,$ represents each of the five measures to proxy opioid demand: grams 
oxycodone, grams hydrocodone, grams morphine equivalence, oxycodone pill count, and 
hydrocodone pill count.  The subscript 𝑚 indicates variables measured by month while 𝑦 
indicates variables measured by year.  Similarly, 𝑠 represents variables measured at the 
state level while 𝑐 represents variables measured at the county level.  As noted by Van 
Ours and Williams (2015), heterogeneity remains a large issue when estimating the 
effects of marijuana consumption.  By controlling for monthly and state fixed effects that 
may affect opioid demand over time or within states, time and county invariant 
heterogeneity between observations is minimized.  This model assumes these unobserved 
effects are uncorrelated with the error of the estimation.  The vector 𝜒!,+ represents 
annual control variables including population, unemployment, and income for each 
county.  This model must meet the assumption that the explanatory variables are not 
associated with the error of the model.  Similarly, testing will be required to confirm the 
error term is not heteroskedastic.   
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This model captures the effect of medical marijuana in the coefficient for the 
MML variable.  𝑀𝑀𝐿%,# is an indicator variable tracking whether medical marijuana 
patients are granted legal amnesty.  If this model finds results consistent with Shi (2017), 
then 𝛽& will be negative confirming that medical marijuana laws reduce overall opioid 
consumption.  𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒! is measured for each county and represents the 
shortest direct distance to a county outside of the state.  A negative value for  𝛽' is 
consistent with opioid diversion through doctor shopping across state borders.  This 
would represent an increase in cost with further travel distance resulting in lower demand 
for opioids.  (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑎	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)# is measured by county and represents the shortest 
distance to a county with legal amnesty for medical marijuana patients.  Should 
marijuana serve as a substitute for opioid consumption, 𝛽( will be positive.  This would 
confirm that opioid consumption declines  as the cost of traveling for medical marijuana 
is reduced.  Because control variables (including population, unemployment, and income) 
can only be found on an annual level, errors are clustered at the county level.  Because of 
the increase in the number of transactions each year noted in Table 1, the model may 
have issues with heteroskedasticity.  Pharmacies may be ordering more in general or may 
have started ordering smaller amounts more frequently.  Either issue has potential for 
causing time dependent changes in the variance of the model’s error term.  If this does 
happen, this can be resolved using robust standard errors in combination with clustered 
errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015).   
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Results	
The regression estimates of equation (1) are shown in Table 6.  The effect on the 
total weight of opioids delivered to counties is detailed in column 1 while the effect on 
the demand for doses is detailed in column 4.  The effects for each drug (oxycodone and 
hydrocodone) are then broken down in the subsequent columns for both weight and 
doses.  Medical Marijuana Law (MML)2 is associated with a 7.27% increase in combined 
opioid weight (by morphine equivalence per capita) and a 4.70% increase in combined 
pill count per capita delivered to counties, relative to counties without medical marijuana 
laws.  This effect is lower for Oxycontin, where MML is associated with an 11.57% 
decrease in grams per capita delivered and a 2.82% increase in pill count per capita, all 
else constant.  Comparatively, MML have a much stronger effect on Hydrocodone 
delivered, and are associated with a 15.14% increase in the grams per capita and a 6.92% 
increase in pills per capita delivered to counties, all else constant.  The estimates for 
hydrocodone are significant with p-values less than 0.01, while the remaining estimates 
have mixed significance.   
A one standard deviation (35.4 mile) decrease in the distance to the nearest border 
county is associated with a 3.54% decrease in the total grams per capita (morphine 
equivalence) and a 3.25% decrease in the pill count per capita, all else constant.  This 
effect is consistent between all models, measuring a 1.9-5.1% decrease in the demand for 
opioids in counties closer to their state borders, and does not hold statistical significance.   
 
2 All interpretations for MML are reached using the interpretation for an indicator variable 
regressed against a logged variable: (𝑒!! − 1) ∗ 100 % Effect. 
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Table 6.  Regression results from the model proposed.  Note the base case for State is Connecticut, 
the base case for age cohorts are adults 65 and older, and the base case for race is Caucasian.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Morphine 
Equiv. 
Grams  
Oxy 
Grams  
Hydro 
Total  
Pill Count 
Oxy  
Pill Count 
Hydro  
Pill Count 
       
Percent of Population  8.014*** 9.915*** 5.980** 4.593** 5.268** 4.177** 
Female (2.854) (3.618) (2.755) (1.979) (2.581) (1.914) 
       
Log: Median  -0.317 -0.0976 -0.666 -0.395 -0.150 -0.537* 
Household Income (0.428) (0.458) (0.459) (0.275) (0.310) (0.283) 
       
Log: Population  0.414*** 0.435*** 0.429*** 0.220*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 
(Annual) (0.0585) (0.0694) (0.0549) (0.0358) (0.0454) (0.0341) 
       
Black Population  -2.614*** -2.998** -3.130*** -2.164*** -2.533*** -2.470*** 
(Percent) (0.891) (1.178) (0.887) (0.489) (0.700) (0.493) 
       
American Indian  -1.425*** 0.0820 -0.544 -0.235 1.194*** 0.182 
Population (Percent) (0.507) (0.590) (0.448) (0.334) (0.372) (0.321) 
       
Asian Population  -8.242** -6.735 -8.711*** -6.526*** -5.883** -5.754*** 
(Percent) (3.436) (4.118) (3.293) (1.969) (2.533) (1.898) 
       
Pacific Islander  15.84 17.05 50.03 9.616 38.34 5.820 
Population (Percent) (68.02) (85.66) (75.11) (41.68) (57.33) (41.34) 
       
All in Poverty  0.0644*** 0.0656*** 0.0488*** 0.0320*** 0.0307*** 0.0297*** 
(Percent) (0.0147) (0.0178) (0.0154) (0.00915) (0.0114) (0.00929) 
       
Population 0 to 19  -3.237 -3.157 -2.671 -2.903** -3.439** -2.689* 
years (Percent) (2.132) (2.423) (2.193) (1.366) (1.540) (1.420) 
       
Population 20 to 39  6.804*** 9.365*** 4.858** 3.835*** 5.425*** 2.976** 
years (Percent) (2.080) (2.281) (2.189) (1.398) (1.544) (1.438) 
       
Population 40 to 64  13.21*** 16.77*** 10.35*** 6.682*** 8.598*** 5.973** 
years (Percent) (3.696) (4.071) (3.507) (2.504) (2.864) (2.495) 
       
Medical Marijuana  0.0702 -0.123** 0.141*** 0.0459** 0.0278 0.0669*** 
Legal Binary (0.0498) (0.0537) (0.0509) (0.0208) (0.0307) (0.0210) 
       
Distance: Nearest County  0.0999 0.145 0.0536 0.0917 0.0780 0.0667 
Out of State (100 Miles) (0.101) (0.118) (0.107) (0.0646) (0.0788) (0.0662) 
       
Distance: Nearest Medical  0.0396*** 0.0452*** 0.0228** 0.0263*** 0.0196*** 0.0281*** 
Marijuana (100 Miles) (0.0112) (0.0127) (0.0108) (0.00630) (0.00723) (0.00643) 
       
Date 0.00706*** 0.00896*** 0.00569*** 0.00636*** 0.00771*** 0.00582*** 
 (0.00130) (0.00147) (0.00133) (0.000771) (0.000891) (0.000784) 
       
Month Fixed Effects       
Month: February -0.0249*** -0.0505*** -0.0121 -0.0371*** -0.0608*** -0.0276*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00964) (0.0100) (0.00434) (0.00545) (0.00512) 
       
Month: March 0.0903*** 0.0770*** 0.0978*** 0.0736*** 0.0688*** 0.0745*** 
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 (0.00883) (0.00966) (0.0105) (0.00457) (0.00546) (0.00566) 
       
Month: April 0.0169* -0.0279*** 0.0627*** 0.0310*** -0.00376 0.0498*** 
 (0.00963) (0.00965) (0.0110) (0.00524) (0.00576) (0.00577) 
       
Month: May 0.0745*** 0.00496 0.131*** 0.0743*** 0.0314*** 0.0935*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00924) (0.0114) (0.00582) (0.00592) (0.00630) 
       
Month: June 0.124*** 0.0512*** 0.178*** 0.0962*** 0.0578*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.00617) (0.00604) (0.00690) 
       
Month: July 0.0943*** 0.0393*** 0.141*** 0.0780*** 0.0448*** 0.0961*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0134) (0.00648) (0.00679) (0.00727) 
       
Month: August 0.121*** 0.0432*** 0.181*** 0.102*** 0.0602*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.00710) (0.00758) (0.00792) 
       
Month: September 0.0931*** 0.0117 0.140*** 0.0496*** 0.0142* 0.0642*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0157) (0.00759) (0.00819) (0.00814) 
       
Month: October 0.116*** 0.0320** 0.179*** 0.0860*** 0.0459*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0165) (0.00814) (0.00877) (0.00902) 
       
Month: November 0.0647*** 0.00227 0.109*** 0.0392*** 0.0183* 0.0503*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.00865) (0.00968) (0.00920) 
       
Month: December 0.175*** 0.0970*** 0.225*** 0.115*** 0.0717*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.00840) (0.00921) (0.00904) 
       
State Fixed Effects       
State: IN 0.673*** -0.307 2.164*** 0.537*** -0.419*** 1.228*** 
 (0.168) (0.191) (0.182) (0.0982) (0.114) (0.111) 
       
State: MA 0.0954 0.123 -0.172 -0.0660 0.0691 -0.314*** 
 (0.136) (0.148) (0.202) (0.0724) (0.0898) (0.0956) 
       
State: MI -0.0965 -1.206*** 1.446*** 0.191* -1.102*** 0.940*** 
 (0.168) (0.191) (0.186) (0.0992) (0.115) (0.114) 
       
State: OH 0.303* 0.114 1.192*** 0.213** -0.0123 0.606*** 
 (0.167) (0.182) (0.183) (0.0908) (0.105) (0.106) 
       
State: RI 0.0333 -0.133 0.962*** 0.0378 -0.271*** 0.398*** 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.194) (0.0872) (0.0950) (0.108) 
       
State: WI -0.347** -0.575*** 0.578*** -0.0408 -0.393*** 0.403*** 
 (0.156) (0.172) (0.166) (0.0861) (0.105) (0.0983) 
       
Constant -13.03*** -20.34*** -7.951* -6.373** -11.75*** -4.927* 
 (4.075) (4.373) (4.244) (2.689) (3.058) (2.692) 
       
Observations 30,216 30,216 30,216 30,216 30,216 30,216 
R-squared 0.442 0.467 0.516 0.435 0.514 0.575 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A similar effect is observed in states without MMLs; a 100-mile decrease in the distance 
to the nearest border with medical marijuana is associated with a 3.96% decrease in 
grams per capita (morphine equivalence) and a 2.63% decrease in the pill count per 
capita, all else constant.  This effect is consistent between 1.9% and 4.5% and all 
estimates are significant with p-values less than 0.01.   
A one percent increase in median household income is associated with a 0.317% 
decrease in the total grams per capita (morphine equivalence) and a 0.395% decrease in 
the total pill count per capita, all else constant.  At the average of observed annual income 
(?̅? = $46,614) a $1,000 increase in median household income is associated with 0.166 
gram per capita decrease in total morphine equivalence and a 0.028 pill per capita 
decrease in pills per capita delivered to counties each month.  For comparison, counties 
received 24.37 grams per capita (morphine equivalence) and 3.252 pills per capita on 
average each month.  These estimates don’t hold strong significance.  The coefficients for 
population show that larger populations are associated with larger per capita opioid 
measures.  The estimates show a ten thousand person increase in population is associated 
with a 0.03% increase in the dependent weight measures and a 0.021% increase in the pill 
count per capita delivered to counties in a month.    
The model estimates consistent effects for all dependent measures of opioid 
supply with regard to age; older populations are associated with higher measures of 
opioids both by weight and number of doses, relative to adults over the age of 65.  
Consistently, a one percent increase in the population under 20 is associated with a 3% 
decrease in all dependent measures, all else constant.  A one percent increase in the 
population ages 20 to 39 is associated with a 4-7% increase in all opioid measures, all 
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else constant.  The largest effect is estimated for the population ages 40 to 64; a one 
percent increase in this population is associated with a 10-16% increase in grams of 
opioids delivered to counties, and a 6-8% increase in doses delivered to counties in a 
month, all else constant.  For the latter two groups, these estimates are all significant, and 
larger effects are estimated for oxycodone specifically.  These results are similar to those 
found by Alpert et al. (2018), who investigated the effect of abuse-deterrent 
reformulation on the opioid overdose deaths.  Alpert measured the largest effect in the 
age group 25 to 64 years old, followed by the effect measured for the group 0 to 24 years 
old.  The effect measured for the group 65 years or older was insignificant and small.  
These effects indicate higher overdose rates in these cohorts following the introduction of 
abuse-deterrent reformulations.  Because higher overdose rates indicate increased access 
to opioids, the differences between these estimates and those found through this paper’s 
model are likely attributed to the difference in age cohort specification.   
The model also makes consistent estimates for the effects of the other control 
variables on the supply of opioids to counties.  A one percent increase in the female 
population is associated with an 8% increase in the weight of opioids supplied and a 4.6% 
increase in the doses supplied, all else constant.  Murphy et al. (2015) also find that the 
proportion of the population that is female is associated with increased likelihood to 
abuse opioids, but Kelly (2019) finds that larger female populations are associated with 
lower overdose deaths.  This confirms the endogeneity between addiction and risk of 
overdose which may affect estimates.  Finally, one percent increase in the black 
population is associated with a 2.6% decrease in all measures of opioids supplied to 
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counties in a month, all else constant.  This estimate is consistent with Kelly (2019), who 
found overdose deaths decrease as the black population increases.   
A review of the residuals for this model largely shows random scatter as expected 
but indicates a strong concern that serial correlation is affecting the models estimates.  
This is likely the effect of endogeneity common to studies of addictive substances noted 
by Van Ours and Williams (2015).  Alternative specifications including a lagged variable 
model are considered to establish the robustness of these estimates. 
Robustness	Testing	
Four models are considered and provided in Tables 7 and 8 which both have the 
results of the original model in the first column.  Model (2) considers an alternative 
specification to measure the potential effect medical marijuana law may have on doctor 
shopping.  Counties are identified with one indicator variable if they are on the border of 
their respective state, while another category of counties are identified if they directly 
border a state that has ratified a medical marijuana law.  This estimate is similar to the 
original model; counties on the border of their state are associated with a 11.66% 
decrease in total grams per capita (morphine equivalence) and an 8.73% decrease in total 
doses per capita, relative to non-border counties and all else constant.  Counties that 
border a state with medical marijuana are associated with a 21.73% decrease in the total 
grams per capita (morphine equivalence) and an 7.06% decrease in total doses per capita.  
This is consistent with the original model which estimates higher opioid consumption in 
counties farther from the state border.  In this model medical marijuana laws are 
associated with a 3.73% decrease in the total grams per capita (morphine equivalence)  
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Table 7.  Regression of Total Morphine Equivalence per Capita (in grams) on various specifications.  
Fixed effects are notes but not shown.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Original 
Model 
Border 
Binaries 
Lagged 
Variable 
Trend Alternative 
Age 
Specification 
      
Female Population  8.014*** 7.542*** 1.160*** 8.039*** 8.051*** 
(Percent) (2.854) (2.870) (0.411) (2.855) (2.885) 
      
Log: Median Household -0.317 -0.325 -0.0273 -0.398 0.329 
Income (0.428) (0.431) (0.0638) (0.420) (0.396) 
      
Log: Annual Population  0.414*** 0.424*** 0.0605*** 0.415***  
(Count) (0.0585) (0.0587) (0.00981) (0.0584)  
      
Black Population  -2.614*** -2.699*** -0.389*** -2.581*** -2.830*** 
(Percent) (0.891) (0.889) (0.135) (0.890) (0.905) 
      
American Indian  -1.425*** -1.449*** -0.218*** -1.411*** -1.335*** 
Population (Percent) (0.507) (0.511) (0.0696) (0.507) (0.470) 
      
Asian Population  -8.242** -8.451** -1.343*** -8.153** -10.93*** 
(Percent) (3.436) (3.455) (0.506) (3.426) (3.270) 
      
Pacific Islander Population 15.84 15.05 5.727 12.74 17.82 
(Percent) (68.02) (69.71) (10.18) (67.59) (65.84) 
      
All in Poverty  0.0644*** 0.0651*** 0.00948*** 0.0615*** 0.0726*** 
(Percent) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.00228) (0.0145) (0.0154) 
      
Population 0 to 19 years  -3.237 -3.612* -0.527 -3.030  
(Percent) (2.132) (2.096) (0.322) (2.116)  
      
Population 20 to 39 years 6.804*** 6.321*** 0.964*** 6.974***  
(Percent) (2.080) (2.112) (0.328) (2.074)  
      
Population 40 to 64 years 13.21*** 12.56*** 1.842*** 13.41***  
(Percent) (3.696) (3.690) (0.611) (3.688)  
      
Medical Marijuana Legal 0.0702 -0.0388 0.0281*** 0.0756 0.0527 
 (0.0498) (0.0421) (0.00715) (0.0495) (0.0501) 
      
Year 0.0847*** 0.0578*** 0.00389*  0.0657*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0130) (0.00234)  (0.0156) 
      
Distance: Nearest County  0.0999  0.0160 0.103 0.0517 
Out of State (100 Miles) (0.101)  (0. 0148) (0.101) (0.105) 
      
Distance: Nearest Medical  0.0396***  0.00303* 0.0446*** 0.0324*** 
Marijuana (100 Miles) (0.0112)  (0.00169) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
      
26 
 
Border Counties  -0.124*    
  (0.0694)    
      
Counties that border   -0.245    
Marijuana Policy  (0.150)    
      
Log: Lagged Morphine    0.852***   
Equiv. (g per cap)   (0.0125)   
      
Date    0.00782***  
    (0.00122)  
      
Log: Population 0 to 19      -2.233*** 
years (Count)     (0.418) 
      
Log: Population 20 to 39      0.884*** 
years (Count)     (0.341) 
      
Log: Population 40 to 64      1.777*** 
 years (Count)     (0.305) 
      
Constant -179.1*** -124.1*** -9.327** -12.67*** -142.5*** 
 (28.63) (23.00) (4.358) (4.047) (28.23) 
      
Month FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 30,216 30,216 29,853 30,216 30,216 
R-squared 0.442 0.446 0.857 0.438 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.  Regression of Total Pill Count per Capita on various specifications.  Fixed effects are 
noted but not shown.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Original 
Model 
Border 
Binaries 
Lagged 
Variable 
Trend Alternative 
Age 
Specification 
      
Female Population  4.593** 4.314** 0.365** 4.609** 4.824** 
(Percent) (1.979) (1.989) (0.164) (1.980) (1.994) 
      
Log: Median Household  -0.395 -0.371 -0.0220 -0.447* -0.0933 
Income (0.275) (0.278) (0.0243) (0.271) (0.250) 
      
Log: Annual Population  0.220*** 0.226*** 0.0181*** 0.221***  
(Count) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.00364) (0.0358)  
      
Black Population  -2.164*** -2.238*** -0.185*** -2.143*** -2.292*** 
(Percent) (0.489) (0.483) (0.0468) (0.488) (0.492) 
      
American Indian  -0.235 -0.252 -0.0320 -0.225 -0.203 
Population (Percent) (0.334) (0.330) (0.0270) (0.334) (0.315) 
      
Asian Population  -6.526*** -6.770*** -0.609*** -6.467*** -7.821*** 
(Percent) (1.969) (1.992) (0.169) (1.962) (1.884) 
      
Pacific Islander  9.616 11.59 2.112 7.611 11.43 
Population (Percent) (41.68) (41.39) (3.494) (41.71) (42.63) 
      
All in Poverty  0.0320*** 0.0331*** 0.00288*** 0.0301*** 0.0359*** 
(Percent) (0.00915) (0.00920) (0.000824) (0.00901) (0.00957) 
      
Population 0 to 19 years  -2.903** -3.269** -0.264** -2.768**  
(Percent) (1.366) (1.338) (0.118) (1.355)  
      
Population 20 to 39 years 3.835*** 3.509** 0.309** 3.945***  
(Percent) (1.398) (1.379) (0.125) (1.394)  
      
Population 40 to 64 years 6.682*** 6.171** 0.522** 6.809***  
(Percent) (2.504) (2.478) (0.238) (2.499)  
      
Medical Marijuana Legal 0.0459** -0.0224 0.0103*** 0.0497** 0.0367* 
 (0.0208) (0.0153) (0.00213) (0.0206) (0.0209) 
      
Year 0.0763*** 0.0566*** -0.00109  0.0672*** 
 (0.00925) (0.00761) (0.000960)  (0.00924) 
      
Distance: Nearest County  0.0917  0.00708 0.0938 0.0701 
Out of State (100 Miles) (0.0646)  (0.00547) (0.0646) (0.0652) 
      
Distance: Nearest Medical  0.0263***  -0.00132** 0.0298*** 0.0227*** 
Marijuana (100 Miles) (0.00630)  (0.000617) (0.00604) (0.00605) 
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Border Counties  -0.0913**    
  (0.0435)    
      
Counties that border   -0.0732    
Marijuana Policy        (0.0754)    
      
Log: Lagged Total Pill    0.915***   
Count (per Capita)   (0.00949)   
      
Date    0.00686***  
    (0.000723)  
      
Log: Population 0 to 19      -1.438*** 
years (Count)     (0.281) 
      
Log: Population 20 to 39      0.626*** 
years (Count)     (0.208) 
      
Log: Population 40 to 64      1.037*** 
years (Count)     (0.214) 
      
Constant -155.9*** -116.1*** 1.839 -6.143** -138.5*** 
 (16.65) (13.20) (1.821) (2.671) (16.30) 
      
Month FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 30,216 30,216 29,853 30,216 30,216 
R-squared 0.435 0.438 0.923 0.429 0.437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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and a 2.22% decrease in the total doses per capita, all else constant.  These 
estimates are not significant but agree with the original estimates to measure doctor 
shopping.   
Although this is a short time series of panel data, there is still concern of serial correlation 
affecting the accuracy of the estimated coefficients.  By its nature, addiction may further 
confound this effect and drive some level of consistent monthly consumption of opioids 
among patients.  Model (3) of tables 7 and 8 include a lagged dependent value to 
investigate the effect serial correlation may have on the original model.  With this new 
specification, the majority of coefficients have the same sign as the original model, but all 
estimates become much smaller when the lagged value is included.  The measured state 
effects also remain consistent but become smaller, indicating the majority of serial 
correlation is not the result of endogenous variables controlled for with fixed effects.  
This is consistent with Van Ours and Williams (2015) and without a strong instrumental 
variable for opioid consumption, this effect will bias all estimates.   
Model (4) of each table considers a trend line in place of month fixed effects and 
a year indicator and finds an equivalent result to the original model, while Model (5) uses 
a logged measure of count for all age cohorts and drops the effect of total population, and 
again the coefficients of this model closely match those of the original model.   
Discussion	
The model predicts that further distance from a jurisdiction with legal marijuana 
is associated with increased opioid use which agrees with the predictions from theory.  
This suggests that as marijuana becomes easier (and therefore cheaper) to obtain, 
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individuals with addictions may substitute to marijuana from opioids. This is consistent 
with Dragone et al. (2018), and confirms that access to marijuana depends on the distance 
to the nearest jurisdiction as this distance changes the cost of illegal procurement.  For 
comparison, Dasgupta et al. (2013) estimate oxycodone had an average price of $10 per 
pill and hydrocodone had an average price of $8 per pill in 2012.   At their means, the 
model estimates a $26,181 reduction in oxycodone sales (?̅? = 1.075 pills per capita) and 
a $59,108 reduction in hydrocodone sales (?̅? = 2.107 pills per capita) for a 100-mile 
decrease in the distance to a legal jurisdiction.3  This change is measured between 
monthly observations and would represent an annual total difference of $1.023 million in 
opioid sales.  These values represent a change in total consumption through pharmacies 
and does not specifically identify a reduction in addictive use or illegal diversion.   
The positive estimates for the impact of MMLs on the demand for opioids capture 
the same endogeneity noted by Brinkman and Mok-Lamme (2017).  While Brinkman and 
Mok-Lamme were able to find instrumental variables to control for the location of 
dispensaries, these same instruments do not hold for this study.  States that pass medical 
marijuana laws by voter referenda may be more likely to treat pain as a community.  
These states may also be more likely to consider new alternatives for pain management, 
which could have affected early consumption of extended-release formulas when 
introduced causing higher and/or sustained consumption in later periods.  Individual 
 
3 These interpretations were reached using the coefficient for the distance to the nearest medical 
marijuana jurisdiction in states that do not have MMLs.  To reach this value, the expression (𝑒" −
1)(𝑝𝚤𝑙𝑙	𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡1111111111111)(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝚤𝑜𝑛111111111111111)(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) where the average pill count and population were taken from the 
study states without medical marijuana laws. 
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patients in these states may be more likely to seek medical treatment in general.  In all of 
these cases, this endogeneity indicates the model estimate is biased and the true effect of 
MMLs is likely different.  This is also the result of the lack of data sets for marijuana use 
beyond those of categorical legal status.  This result may also be the effect of this 
variable picking up additional trend effects over the study period within these states. 
While some states have implemented databases as part of their medical marijuana 
programs, these systems still face questions of how such information can be used and 
access to this data remains inconsistent even within states.  Given potential endogeneity 
concerns, investigating an instrumental variable would shed invaluable light into the 
nature of the use of addictive substances.  In states such as Colorado, Michigan, Illinois 
and Maine where marijuana is legal recreationally would make ideal candidates to 
investigate whether the per unit cost of electricity may be such a variable;  these states 
have unideal agricultural conditions for growing marijuana outdoors for large portions of 
the year, but businesses involved in dispensing marijuana must source all product from 
within the state due to federal limitations on interstate trade.  Many growing operations 
may rely on indoor greenhouse facilities which can take larger than usual amounts of 
electricity (an anomaly used to locate illegal growing operations in states where 
marijuana is not legal) and growers may attempt to schedule the growth of product 
around perceived trends in the cost of electricity in their states.   
Finally, as part of the identification strategy this study controlled for potential 
effects of doctor shopping between jurisdictions by measuring each counties distance to 
the nearest state border.  The model indicates that opioid usage increases with distance 
from the border in a state that has legalized marijuana use which is in conflict with prior 
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research and the economic model proposed.   Because doctor shoppers travel across state 
borders to bypass reporting systems, the distance to the border would represent some cost 
that varies based on the presumed distance travelled.  Dragone et al. (2018) find the 
opposite effect with much stronger accuracy.  Their study, which compared Washington 
and Oregon during the period when recreational marijuana was legalized, relied heavily 
on how similar these jurisdictions were and how close to passing or not each state was 
when voting to make this change.  The states of this study do not share such similarities 
which may explain the differences in results.  This can also be explained through the 
implementation of prescription monitoring programs in all of the states prior to the study 
period and discouraging such activity. 
Conclusion	
Shifting drug policy in the United States indicate shifting beliefs as new 
information becomes available and voters in each state reconsider the legality of 
marijuana.  Recent studies have shown Marijuana can treat PTSD, chronic pain, anxiety, 
depression, and a large cohort of other chronic diseases that weigh down the modern 
medical system (Bowles, 2012; Bradford & Bradford, 2016; Lynch & Campbell, 2011).  
Simultaneously, medications once believed non-addictive have given rise to one of the 
largest drug pandemics in recent history (HHS.Gov).  This problem has only intensified 
with the introduction of Fentanyl, a far more potent (2.4 mg morphine equivalence 
compared to oxycodone’s 1.5 mg equivalence) and cheaper opioid which illegal drug 
markets have begun using to mask the impurity of other substances (Ehley, 2020).  In 
response to this practice, fentanyl test strips have become available in some jurisdictions 
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to allow individuals to test for the substance to prevent accidental overdose (Goldman et 
al., 2019).  Another recent intervention to prevent overdose due to opioid use is the 
discovery of Naloxone, a medication which is sprayed into the nasal cavity during an 
overdose to block opioid receptors and reverse the effects of the drugs taken (SAMHSA 
HHS).  Embracing this new medication, the chief medical official of numerous states 
including Montana and Wisconsin have issued standing orders to make Naloxone 
available without prescription at pharmacies within their state (MT Standing Order; WI 
Standing Order). Despite these interventions, the number of overdose deaths has begun to 
rise again as drug impurities cause more accidental overdoses (Ehley, 2020). 
Policy makers will need sound knowledge on the true relationship between 
addictive substances to best address the shifting opinions and new information available.  
The rise of states considering or passing laws for medical and even recreational 
marijuana have introduced an unprecedented access to marijuana related product.  While 
this study has investigated the nature between marijuana and opioids, further research 
will be crucial to empower future policy makers to define and regulate these new 
industries.  By measuring the cost of travelling to different legal jurisdictions, this study 
confirms that pursuing new and thoughtful sources of data will only improve knowledge 
on how to understand the nature of addiction best.        
 	
34 
 
Citations	
About the Epidemic | HHS.gov. (n.d.). Retrieved November 12, 2019, from 
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html 
Alpert, A., Powell, D., & Pacula, R. L. (2018). Supply-Side Drug Policy in the Presence 
of Substitutes: Evidence from the Introduction of Abuse-Deterrent Opioids. 
American Economic Journal. Economic Policy, 10(4), 1–35. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170082 
Associated Press. (2011, August 25). Police raid 2 Mich. Medical marijuana 
dispensaries. https://advance-lexis-
com.weblib.lib.umt.edu:2443/document?crid=f719c45c-1a81-41ce-8bed-
2113c32acc3c&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3Ac
ontentItem%3A53MV-MT11-JBGK-F338-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=304481&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true 
Bowles, D. W. (2012). Persons Registered for Medical Marijuana in the United States. 
Journal of Palliative Medicine, 15(1), 9–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1089/jpm.2011.0356 
Bowmaker, S. W. (2005). Economics Uncut: A Complete Guide to Life, Death and 
Misadventure. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
Bradford, A. C., & Bradford, W. D. (2016). Medical Marijuana Laws Reduce 
Prescription Medication Use In Medicare Part D. Health Affairs, 35(7), 1230–
1236. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.1661 
35 
 
Bretteville-Jensen, A. L., & Biørn, E. (2004). Do prices count? A micro-econometric 
study of illicit drug consumption based on self-reported data. Empirical 
Economics, 29(3), 673–695. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-004-0205-9 
Brinkman, J., & Mok-Lamme, D. (2017). Not in My Backyard? Not So Fast. The Effect of 
Marijuana Legalization on Neighborhood Crime (Working Paper (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) No. 17–19). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2017.19 
Buchmueller, T. C., & Carey, C. (2018). The Effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs on Opioid Utilization in Medicare. American Economic Journal. 
Economic Policy, 10(1), 77–112. 
http://dx.doi.org.weblib.lib.umt.edu:8080/10.1257/pol.20160094 
Bulloch, M. (2018, July 26). The Evolution of the PDMP. Pharmacy Times. 
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/marilyn-bulloch-pharmd-
bcps/2018/07/the-evolution-of-the-pdmp 
Cicero, T. J., & Ellis, M. S. (2015). Abuse-Deterrent Formulations and the Prescription 
Opioid Abuse Epidemic in the United States: Lessons Learned From OxyContin. 
JAMA Psychiatry, 72(5), 424–430. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2014.3043 
Cicero, T. J., Inciardi, J. A., & Muñoz, A. (2005). Trends in Abuse of OxyContin® and 
Other Opioid Analgesics in the United States: 2002-2004. The Journal of Pain, 
6(10), 662–672. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2005.05.004 
36 
 
Colin Cameron, A., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust 
Inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317–372. 
https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 
Dasgupta, N., Freifeld, C., Brownstein, J. S., Menone, C. M., Surratt, H. L., Poppish, L., 
Green, J. L., Lavonas, E. J., & Dart, R. C. (2013). Crowdsourcing Black Market 
Prices For Prescription Opioids. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 15(8), 
e178. https://doi.org/10.2196/jmir.2810 
Dragone, D., Prarolo, G., Vanin, P., & Zanella, G. (2018). Crime and the legalization of 
recreational marijuana. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.005 
Drilling into the DEA’s pain pill database. (n.d.). Washington Post. Retrieved October 
15, 2019, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/dea-pain-pill-
database/ 
Drug Overdose Deaths | Drug Overdose | CDC Injury Center. (2019, August 30). 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html 
Ehley, B. (2020, July 15). Fatal overdoses climbed to record high in 2019, reversing 
historic progress. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/15/drug-
overdoses-record-high-363719 
Goldman, J. E., Waye, K. M., Periera, K. A., Krieger, M. S., Yedinak, J. L., & Marshall, 
B. D. L. (2019). Perspectives on rapid fentanyl test strips as a harm reduction 
practice among young adults who use drugs: A qualitative study. Harm Reduction 
Journal, 16(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12954-018-0276-0 
37 
 
Hassan, A. (2019, October 2). A Doctor Who Prescribed 500,000 Doses of Opioids Is 
Sent to Prison for 40 Years [News Publisher]. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/us/opioids-doctor-sentenced-joel-
smithers.html 
Jones, M. R., Viswanath, O., Peck, J., Kaye, A. D., Gill, J. S., & Simopoulos, T. T. 
(2018). A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain Medicine. 
Pain and Therapy, 7(1), 13–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40122-018-0097-6 
Kelly, C. R. (2019). The Effect of Health Care Access on Opioid Overdoses at the County 
Level in the United States [M.P.P., Georgetown University]. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/2240072999/abstract/A9E8698A1A1F4203P
Q/1 
Lynch, M. E., & Campbell, F. (2011). Cannabinoids for treatment of chronic non-cancer 
pain; a systematic review of randomized trials. British Journal of Clinical 
Pharmacology, 72(5), 735–744. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-
2125.2011.03970.x 
Meier, B. (2007, May 10). In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million. The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-
web.html 
MT Standing Order. (n.d.). 2. 
Murphy, S. M., Friesner, D. L., & Rosenman, R. (2015). Opioid Misuse Among 
Adolescents: New Evidence from a Misclassification Analysis. Applied Health 
Economics and Health Policy; Auckland, 13(2), 181–192. 
Newton, D. (2018). The Opioid Crisis: A reference handbook. ABC-CLIO. 
38 
 
Offit, P. A. (2017). Pandora’s Lab. National Geographic. 
Pacula, Rosalie L., Powell, D., Heaton, P., & Sevigny, E. L. (2015). Assessing the Effects 
of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana Use: The Devil is in the Details. 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 34(1), 7–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21804 
Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo, Hunt, P., & Boustead, A. (2014). Words Can Be Deceiving: A 
Review of Variation Among Legally Effective Medical Marijuana Laws in the 
United States. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 7(1), 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2014-0001 
PDMP Center of Excellence. (2014). Briefing on PDMP Effectiveness. Brandeis 
University. 
Powell, D., Pacula, R. L., & Jacobson, M. (2018). Do medical marijuana laws reduce 
addictions and deaths related to pain killers? Journal of Health Economics, 58, 
29–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.007 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) | The PDMP Training 
and Technical Assistance Center. (n.d.). Retrieved January 11, 2020, from 
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/prescription-drug-monitoring-frequently-
asked-questions-faq 
Sabia, J. J., & Nguyen, T. T. (2018). The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Labor 
Market Outcomes. The Journal of Law and Economics, 61(3), 361–396. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/701193 
Saffer, H., & Chaloupka, F. (1999). THE DEMAND for ILLICIT DRUGS. Economic 
Inquiry, 37(3), 401–411. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01439.x 
39 
 
SAMHSA HHS. (n.d.). Naloxone. Retrieved July 31, 2020, from 
https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment/naloxone 
Shi, Y. (2017). Medical marijuana policies and hospitalizations related to marijuana and 
opioid pain reliever. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 173, 144–150. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2017.01.006 
The Huffington Post. (2013, February 8). Michigan Medical Marijuana Dispensaries 
Illegal, State Supreme Court Rules 4-1. https://advance-lexis-
com.weblib.lib.umt.edu:2443/document?crid=523cfb6d-590b-4417-961c-
a97cf571b8d5&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3Ac
ontentItem%3A57PD-7J21-JCMN-Y0TD-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=299488&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true 
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse 
and Abuse. (2019). US Food and Drug Administration. 
US GAO. (2011). MEDICARE PART D: Instances of Questionable Access to 
Prescription Drugs. United States Government Accountability Office. 
van Ours, J. C. (1995). The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in the 
Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938. Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), 261–279. 
Van Ours, J. C., & Williams, J. (2015). Cannabis Use and Its Effects on Health, 
Education and Labor Market Success. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(5), 993–
1010. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12070 
WI Standing Order. (2016, August 22). Wisconsin Department of Health Services. 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/opioids/standing-order.htm 
 
